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the fact that the acts involved relate to distinct subject matters as
lending support to the conclusion that there is no repeal by implication.
It is believed that the instant case is consistent with prior decisions of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky and with the attitude to
which that court seems to be committed with reference to repeals by
implication.

JOE R. JoHNsoN, JR.

EQUITY: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT TO
RECONVEY LAND TRANSFERRED BY FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE
Appellee deeded land to appellant, his son, to prevent the execution of a judgment lien held against his land. Appellant agreed to
reconvey and upon his failure to do so appellee filed this bill for
specific performance. Appellant contends there is no aid in equity
for one who transfers land in fraud of creditors. Appellee asserts
that his judgment creditor chose not to enforce his claim against the
land and therefore was not in fact defrauded. He claims further that
appellant failed to affirmatively plead the fraudulent conveyance.
The order of the Circuit Court granting specific performance was
overruled. Asher v Asher, 278 Ky. 802, 129 S. W. (2d) 552 (1939).
It is clear in Kentucky and elsewhere that one who transfers
land in fraud of creditors subjects himself to certain limitations on
future action, one of which is his inability to have specific performance of a contract to reconvey the land.' This inability results from
a failure to conform to equitable standards of conduct. These
standards as most often expressed by courts of equity in denying
relief are two: (1) the parties are in pari delicto.2 or (2) one must
come into equity with "clean hands". The court in the principal
case reaffirms this principle that equitable relief is predicated on a
"Section 1059 relates to the county judge and section 1833 deals
with1 the fiscal court.
Carson v. Beliles, 121 Ky. 294, 89 S. W. 208(1905); Coleman v.
Coleman, 147 Ky. 383, 144 S. W. 1(1912); Shamo v. Benjamin's
Adm'r., 155 Ky. 373, 159 S. W. 798(1913); Ballance v. Ballance, 213
Ky. 73, 280 S. W. 473(1926); Dunne v. Cunningham, 234 Mass. 332,
125 N. E. 560(1920); Palmer v. Palmer, 100 Neb. 741, 161 N. W. 277
(1917).
2
Jones v. Jefferson, 334 Mo. 606, 66 S. W. (2d) 555(1933) (The
materiality of the maxim "in pari delicto" is fully discussed in this
case that is strikingly like the instant case. The grantor conveyed
property to his daughter in anticipation of a suit for breach of
promise and was precluded by the doctrine of "unclean hands" from
having equitable relief from the daughter's repudiation of the agreement to reconvey). Accord: McRae v. McRae, 37 Ariz. 307, 294 Pac.
280(1930); New York, New Hampshire, etc., Railroad v. Pierce, 281
Mass. 479, 183 N. E. 836(1933).
vGrant
v. Grant, 296 S. W. 647(Tex. App. 1926); Brugman v.
Charleson, 44 N. D. 114, 171 N. W. 882(1919); Bouton v. Beers, 78
Conn. 714, 63 Atl. 193(1905).

CASE COMMENTS
transaction free from fraud or illegal or inequitable conduct in this
manner:
.. ... by his own iniquitous acts the plaintiff has pitched
himself into the mire and he cannot now call upon the clean
hand of equity of extricate him."'
In spite of the expressive language used the instant case does not
present such a precise and obvious situation. Here, although the
transfer was made for the purpose of preventing execution of a judgment against the land, the transferor's judgment creditor chose not to
subject the property to a lien, and hence was not defrauded by the
conveyance. Granting that an ineffectual purpose is no purpose,
there was no fraud in this case in fact, only an intent to defraud.
The following assertion of the court places the transferor in the
unenviable position of having to prove that he intended to convey
bona fide before he may have specific performance of the agreement
to reconvey:
. . . It is of no help to plaintiff that his contemplated
fraud did not have actual effect. He intended to defraud his
creditor and this besmeared the transaction with moral turpitude. . ."
Whether the mere intent of the grantor to defraud is sufficient to
render the conveyance fraudulent is not well settled in the cases.
The question usually arises in interpreting the purpose of statutes
against fraudulent conveyances. One line of decisions takes the
position that the policy against fraudulent conveyances, whether it
be expressed by statute or the maxim of "unclean hands", does not
operate as a moral code on the conscience of the party making the
conveyance, but its purpose is to protect the legal or equitable rights
of others. The conflicting authority is equally certain that no one is
entitled to the aid of a court of equity to enforce a contract entered
into with a fraudulent intention and for a fraudulent purpose.7 There
can be little doubt as to the position of Kentucky after the present
decision.
The right of the transferor to recover his property is not always
confined to a suit for specific performance. Quite often a transfer in
fraud of creditors is made in the form of a trust for the benefit of the
transferor. Upon the failure of the trust because of illegality it is
necessary to determine whether there is a resulting trust to the transferor, or in case of his death to his heirs at law.' Similarly, where
there is no trust but the transferee is unjustly enriched, if such unjust
'Asher v. Asher, 278 Ky. 802, 805, 129 S. W. (2d) 552(1939).
'Id. at 804.
'Day v. Lown, 51 Iowa 361, 1 N. W. 786(1879); Rivera v. White,
94 Tex. 538, 63 S. W. 125(1901) Dothan Oil Mid. Co. v. Espy, 220 Ala.
685, 127 So. 178(1930).
'Pride v. Andrew, 51 Ohio St. 405, 38 N. E. 84(1894); Tantum v.
Miller, 11 N. J. Eq. 551 (1858); Comment, (1931) 11 Boston U. L.
Rev. 282.
'3 Scott, Trusts (1939) sec. 422
'Id. at sec. 422.2.
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enrichment is accompanied by fraud on the part of the transferee, the
transferee may be declared a constructive trustee for the transferor.2 '
In each instance a question of policy is again involved. 1
In each case
it is necessary to decide if the policy against permitting unjust enrichment of the transferee is outweighed by the policy against giving
relief to a person who has voluntarily entered into an illegal transaction.
The court in the principal case did not raise either possibility.
It is difficult to see how a constructive trust could be construed for
the transferee's unjust enrichment is not accompanied by fraud on
his part. It is submitted however that the transfer here, coupled
with an agreement to reconvey, indicated an intention for the transferee to hold the property in trust for the transferor. Upon failure of
this trust because of illegality there was a resulting trust, and the
trustee is bound to return the property. The position of the
transferee here indicates that the policy, in this instance at least,
should be against permitting unjust enrichment rather than against
relieving a fraudulent conveyor. If the suit were for cancellation
of the fraudulent conveyance it would be necessary to prove the
creditor actually defrauded' but in this suit for specific performance
he needs only to assert "unclean" hands on the part of the plaintiff.
The position of the court in regard to the incidental problem of
pleading the fraudulent conveyance is more tenable, for the doctrine
of "unclean hands" goes to the discretionary powers of the court.u
The transferee is protected, not because of an equitable defense available to him, but because a transferor who has transferred in fraud of
creditors cannot invoke the conscience of the chancellor.
W. L. MATTHEWS, JR.

"1 Scott, Trusts (1939) see. 42.1.
Restatement, Trusts (1935) sec. 422.
Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances (1931) 83.
' That fraud is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded in
Kentucky see: Transylvania Casualty Ins. Co. v. Paritz, 184 Ky. 807,
213 S. W. 185(1919); Tandy et al. v. Wolfe, 270 Ky. 556, 110 S. W.
(2d) 277(1937).
The court in the principal case recognized this fact
but expressly said: "But it does not take an affirmative defense to
defeat plaintiff", 278 Ky. 802, 805, 129 S. W. (2d) 552(1939); See also,
Clark, Principles of Equity (1919) sec. 30.

